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Abstract—An online auction waterfall for an ad impression
may contain auctions that are unlikely to result in a winning
bid. Instead of always running through the full auction sequence,
one could reduce the transaction cost by predicting and skipping
these auctions. In this paper, we derive the auction abort rule
that maximizes the net income of the waterfall under certain
conditions, knowing only the publisher tag of the current auction
and the ad request context. The net income is defined as the
payoff (revenue) minus the transaction cost. We translate the
abort rule into a purity measure and propose a corresponding
split criterion for a decision tree. Training and testing on
randomly sampled data indicate that the abort decision tree
performs better than the full waterfall and the abort rule that
makes use of only the publisher tag feature. When the transaction
cost is higher, the cost saving, and thus net income gain, is higher
for either abort decision rule.
Index Terms—auction waterfall, decision tree, transaction cost
I. INTRODUCTION
An online ad supply-side platform (SSP) that seeks to
maximize revenue from an ad impression has traditionally
implemented an auction waterfall [1], [2], where a sequence
of auctions, each with different parameters, is held in order
to sell the impression. The platform traverses the sequence
of auction parameters, holding one auction after another, until
a winning bid is found. When this occurs, the SSP stops the
auction sequence and the impression is returned to the winning
bidder. For example, the first auction could be intended for
buyers with exclusive, first-look access to the inventory. More
information could be disclosed on the impression, and the
reserve price would be higher. As one goes down the auction
waterfall, less information would be disclosed to the buyers,
and the reserve price would decrease. A schema of the process
is shown in Fig. 1.
The auction waterfall length for an ad impression can vary
in length: a typical number would be from three to five. There
are some ad impressions for which certain auctions in the
waterfall are unlikely to produce a winning bid. Indeed, some
ad impressions are not interesting for buyers and they may not
even return bids in response to the bid requests. To simplify
terminology, we shall also consider this to be a “lost” auction.
A simplistic implementation of the auction waterfall would
be to run through the entire auction sequence regardless of
the quality of the ad impression. This is not optimal for the
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Fig. 1: Schema of an SSP conducting a waterfall auction for
an ad impression.
SSP, since there is a transaction cost to running auctions, e.g.,
network and machine costs. A more optimal approach is to
only hold the auctions that are likely to succeed. More specif-
ically, the SSP should hold an auction only if it has expected
positive net income (NI), where the net income is defined as
the difference between the payoff and the transaction cost.
Auction theory is a rich field, and has found applicability
in various fields like online ads [3], [4] and airline seat book-
ing [5]. While single-decision or static auctions were studied
at the beginning [6], there has been a trend towards studying
dynamic auctions [7]–[9]. An advanced SSP would generate
its auction waterfall dynamically to maximize revenue. To
the authors’ best knowledge, however, optimizing the auction
waterfall to maximize net income has not been considered in
published literature before.
In this paper, we consider the case where the auction
sequence is a priori unknown and seek, via a decision tree,
to abort auctions that are unlikely to produce a positive NI
for the ad impression. The abort decision is applied on an
auction-by-auction basis.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
An ad impression opportunity generated by a user landing
on publisher page creates an ad request r. This is resolved by
holding a sequence of auctions in order to sell the impression.
Suppose that there are N auctions in the waterfall with
publisher tags t1, . . ., tN . The publisher tag is a unique
identifier that defines the auction parameters. N is not constant
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for all ad impressions, but is a configurable publisher setting.
Thus, on an SSP, there are potentially waterfalls of different
lengths for different publishers.
At the i-th auction, given ti and the ad request context θ,
we want to derive a decision rule on whether or not to abort
the auction so as to maximize the expected net income of the
ad request, defined as the expected payoff minus the expected
transaction cost. Define ai ∈ {0, 1}, 1 ≤ i ≤ N to be the abort
flag for publisher tag ti. If ai = 1, we abort the i-th auction;
otherwise, we hold it. If the i-th auction is aborted, the system
continues to the next auction in the sequence and decides if it
wants to hold that. Alternatively, if the i-th auction is carried
out, the ad request is resolved if there is a successful bid;
otherwise, the system proceeds to the next auction, just as in
the case of ai = 1.
Let f(r) be the payoff and ζ(r) be the number of played
auctions in the ad request r. Clearly, 1 ≤ ζ(r) ≤ min(N, |{i :
ai = 0}|). In order to simplify the problem, we assume that
there is a fixed cost c to running an auction. This may not
be true: for example, one could have a different number of
bid requests for different publisher tags, and the network cost
is proportional to the number of bid requests, c.f. Fig. 1. We
want to therefore maximize the expected net income, which is
E[NI] = E[f(r)]− cE[ζ(r)] (1)
where the expectation is taken of all ad requests r. Suppose
that N is known. To maximize E[NI], one would solve
argmaxa1,...,aNE[NI] to obtain optimal ai’s.
In our application, we do not know N a priori nor do we
know the sequence of publisher tags. This lack of precise
knowledge on the auction waterfall leads us to consider the
problem of maximizing E[NI] knowing only the ad request
context θ and the publisher tag ti of the current auction.
III. DERIVATION OF THE OPTIMAL ABORT DECISION RULE
TO MAXIMIZE THE EXPECTED NET INCOME
A. Derivation
Suppose that we are at auction 1 ≤ i ≤ N and want to
decide if it is better to abort auction i or not. Consider two
cases.
Case 1. Abort auction i. Assume that:
1) the expected payoff of the ad request r is the same as
the case that auction i loses, and
2) the expected number of auctions associated with the ad
request r is one less than in the case that auction i loses
The expected net income, taking into account the payoff and
auction costs, is then
E[f(r)|auctioni loses]− c(E[ζ(r)|auctioni loses]− 1)
=E[f(r)|ti loses]− c(E[ζ(r)|ti loses]− 1) (2)
where the conditional expectation is taken over all ad requests
r whose auction sequence includes the tag ti, and ti loses.
Assumptions (1) and (2) may only approximately hold. For
example, the auction sequence could be ordered so that the
first few auctions maximize the revenue and the remaining
auctions maximize the fill rate, i.e., the sale of the impression.
Another possible scenario is that some buyers act strategically
to withdraw or modify their bids in higher tiers of the waterfall
since they anticipate being able to buy the impression more
cheaply in a lower tier.
Case 2: Keep (hold) auction i. The expected net income is
simply
E[f(r)]− c · E[ζ(r)] (3)
where the expectation is taken over all ad requests r whose
auction sequence includes the tag ti.
The decision rule for ai is obtained by comparing the
expected net income of the two cases, e.g., (2) vs. (3). If
Pr(ti wins) = 0, then ai = 1. Otherwise, if Pr(ti wins) 6= 0,
after some simplification, one obtains
E[f(r)|ti wins]− E[f(r)|ti loses]
ai=0
≷
ai=1
c
(
1
Pr(ti wins)
+ E[ζ(r)|ti wins]− E[ζ(r)|ti loses]
) (4)
B. Discussion
Consider some special cases in the application of the
decision rule (4).
• Zero transaction cost. Then, c = 0, and ai = 0 iff
E[f(r)|ti wins] > E[f(r)|ti loses]. Irrespective of how
small Pr(ti wins) is, it is still better to hold auction i.
• Non-zero transaction cost and auction i has a very small
win probability. The RHS of (4) will be a large positive
number and will most likely be higher than the LHS. In
this case, it is better to abort auction i.
It is important to realize that the optimal decision rule
given in (4) maximizes the expected net income conditioned
on knowing only the publisher tag ti. However, if other
features are available, these should be used as additional
conditioning variables as the expectations would be generally
better estimators of the observed values. Consequently, one
would expect a better abort decision rule.
C. Adjustment for correlating effects
The assumptions in Sec. III-A may not hold if there is a
correlation between tag ti losing and E[f(r)], E[ζ(r)]. Tag
ti losing may be correlated with a lower expected payoff.
Then, the expected payoff if the auction were aborted would
be higher than E[f(r)|ti loses]. There is an opposite effect on
ζ: tag ti losing may be correlated to a longer auction sequence.
In this case, if the auction were aborted, the expected number
of auctions would be smaller than E[ζ(r)|ti loses]. The net
effect is to decrease the LHS of (4) and increase its RHS,
making an abort decision more likely.
The critical terms in the decision rule are E[f(r)|ti wins]−
E[f(r)|ti loses] and E[ζ(r)|ti wins] − E[ζ(r)|ti loses]. One
way to reduce the correlating effect on the payoff is to
reweigh observations in the calculation of the difference of
expectations. Define b˜(r) to be the median bid of ad request r.
Instead of E[f(r)|ti wins]−E[f(r)|ti loses], compute instead
E[E[f(r)|ti wins, b˜(r)]− E[f(r)|ti loses, b˜(r)]] (5)
where the outer expectation is over b˜(r) and set
Pr(b˜(r)|ti wins) = Pr(b˜(r)|ti loses) = Pr(b˜(r)), i.e., the
distribution of b˜(r) is independent of ti winning or losing.
Having identical median bid distributions in either a win or
loss brings us closer, one hopes, to the first assumption in
Sec. III-A.
To perform the computation, one must obtain a clustering
of the bid medians b˜(r). Let B1, . . . , BL denote a partition of
the bid median support, where |Bj | ≥ 1 for all j. Then, (5)
can be calculated as
L∑
j=1
{E[f(r)|ti wins, b˜(r) ∈ Bj ]−
E[f(r)|ti loses, b˜(r) ∈ Bj ]} Pr(Bj) (6)
where Pr(Bj) ≈ the proportion of ad requests r whose
b˜(r) ∈ Bj . A similar computation can be carried out for
E[ζ(r)|ti wins]−E[ζ(r)|ti loses]. Here, we assume that b˜(r)
correlates to the number of auctions ζ(r).
IV. DESIGN OF THE DECISION TREE
We noted in Sec. III-B that additional features beyond the
publisher tag should be used in the abort decision rule. For
example, the ad request context θ includes user information,
which is critically important for buyers of an ad impression.
These user features would consequently also be predictive of
whether an auction is worth running or not.
Decision trees are well known in the machine learning
community [10], having been used in different applications.
We want to design an the abort decision tree classifier using
ϕ := (θ, ti) as the available features in order to classify an
auction as either “abort” or “keep”, so ai = 1 and ai = 0
respectively. Note that the payoff and auction waterfall length
associated with each auction in the leaves are functions of the
ad request r. The decision tree therefore incorporates auction
sequence information.
A natural purity measure comes from the optimal decision
rule (4), where the expected net income between “abort” and
“keep” is compared. We propose using the absolute difference
of the expected net income (ADENI) when the auction is held
vs. when it is aborted. This is
ADENI = |Pr(auction wins) · {
E[f(r)|auction wins]− E[f(r)|auction loses])
−c(E[ζ(r)|auction wins]− E[ζ(r)|auction loses])} − c|
(7)
A larger ADENI is desirable. The split criterion is then the
gain in the purity measure. Assuming an n-ary decision tree,
and defining ADENI(S) to be the ADENI computed over the
set of observations S one obtains
ADENI(S)−
n∑
j=1
pjADENI(Sj), where pj :=
|Sj |
|S| (8)
and Sj , j = 1, . . . , n is a partition of S. Two stopping
heuristics are used: when the size of a node falls below a
threshold Tnode, or when the increase in the ADENI purity
criterion given by (8) falls below a threshold TADENI.
ADENI can be adapted to (5) by simply changing the way
that the differences in expectations are calculated.
V. EXPERIMENTS
A binary decision tree (n = 2) is estimated using the split
criterion given by (8), and is benchmarked against the simple
decision rule (4) that only takes into account the publisher tag.
Define NIc,η to be the net income assuming an auction cost of
c in CPM and the abort decision rule η, where η ∈ {0, s, t} for
when there is no abort rule, the simple rule, or the decision
tree rule respectively. In order to calculate the performance
of the decision rules η ∈ {s, t}, we use as the performance
metrics the NI delta change ∆NIc,η
def
= NIc,η − NIc,0 and the
NI percent change %NIc,η
def
= ∆NIc,η/NIc,0 · 100.
Experimental data is drawn from 50 publishers on the
Oath publisher platform. The train dataset comprises randomly
sampled data from one day’s worth of auctions and the test
dataset comprises randomly sampled data from the following
day. The train and test datasets have 195,122,188 auctions
and 226,012,100 auctions respectively. We consider three
possible values for the auction cost c: $0.003663, $0.007326,
and $0.010989 in Cost Per Mille (CPM). The nominal c =
$0.007326 is the estimated transaction cost based on historical
billing data, and we consider c values ±50% around the
nominal value. The test dataset’s payoff is $8,897.82. Using
the nominal transaction cost, it has a net income of $7,242.06.
The results are given in Table I below. We tested out the
adjustment in Sec. III-C to reduce the correlating effect of
an auction loss to the payoff and auction sequence length.
Since no significant difference was observed, these results are
omitted for the sake of brevity. A possible explanation is that
the assumptions in Case 1 of Sec. III-A approximately hold.
The decision tree rule has better performance than the simple
TABLE I: Performance comparison of the simple vs. decision
tree abort rule on the test dataset for different auction cost c
(in CPM cent).
Abort rule NI delta change ∆NIc,η NI percent change %NIc,η
c = 0.3663¢ (CPM), NIc,0 =$8,069.94
Simple $42.06 0.52%
Tree $102.72 1.27%
c = 0.7326¢ (CPM), NIc,0 =$7,242.06
Simple $187.31 2.59%
Tree $355.71 4.91%
c = 1.0989¢ (CPM), NIc,0 =$6,414.17
Simple $404.36 6.30%
Tree $820.87 12.80%
rule. As the auction cost c increases, the NI percent change
%NIc,η increases for both abort rules η. This is because, when
c increases, its impact on the NI becomes more significant. If
one is able to skip unsuccessful auctions, there is a noticeable
savings gain to be realized.
The savings gain varies from publisher to publisher. In
Fig. 2, we plot histograms of the average NI delta in CPM
dollar for each publisher at different values of the auction
cost c. The average NI delta is defined as the delta NI divided
by the number of ad requests. From the histograms, this
number generally increases in magnitude as the auction cost
c increases. The benefit of aborting an unprofitable auction
appears to increase the higher the auction cost. Irrespective of
c, the simple rule always has several negative average delta
NI. The decision tree rule, which makes use of user-specific
features, has non-negative performance for all publishers when
c = 0.7326¢ and c = 1.0989¢. When c = 0.3663¢, there are
several publishers for which the average delta NI is negative.
(a) c = 0.3663¢, simple rule (b) c = 0.3663¢, tree rule
(c) c = 0.7326¢, simple rule (d) c = 0.7326¢, tree rule
(e) c = 1.0989¢, simple rule (f) c = 1.0989¢, tree rule
Fig. 2: Histograms of average NI delta change in CPM dollar
at different auction costs c (in CPM cent) for the simple and
decision tree-based abort auction rules.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Under certain conditions, we derived the optimal auction
abort decision rule to maximize the expected net income
given only the publisher tag of the current auction and the
ad request context. A purity measure and splitting criterion
were proposed to construct an abort decision tree. In the
experiment conducted, the decision tree rule that takes into
account additional features like user-related features performs
better than the simple rule that just uses the publisher tag
feature. In order to confirm the results of the experiments,
we would have to A/B test. If we find that the explore
cost opportunity is significant, we could consider contextual
bandits.
A better abort decision rule could be achieved if more
information were available regarding the auction sequence,
e.g., if the auction sequence were known a priori, or if auction
sequence probabilities were known or could be estimated.
Indeed, the decision rule and decision tree derived in this work
did not even make use of the auction index i. To illustrate
how much information is contained in additional knowledge
of the waterfall, suppose that the SSP is at publisher tag ti but
knows that tag ti+1 has a higher expected payoff. It makes
sense then to skip the current auction and move on to the next
one in the sequence. A limited form of waterfall optimization
has been explored in this work in the sense that, rather than
start out with a sub-optimal waterfall designed to maximize
revenue and prune off unprofitable auctions, one could design
the auction sequence to maximize net income from the very
start.
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